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I am delighted to endorse this submission 
by Jordan Rodgers. Jordan originally wrote 
this paper for my Honors Proseminar (HON 
301) class. His very thoughtful analysis of ethical issues regarding 
selfishness and altruism, their roles in our quest to be moral and 
happy beings, and ultimately our debt to ourselves and society is 
very worthy for publication. Using work of Friedrich Nietzsche, 
Jordan address the conflict between the selfish individual and 
his obligations to society. Kaleidoscope, the UK Journal of 
Undergraduate Scholarship is a very fitting venue for this well 
considered analysis concerning human nature and our striving 
for perfection.
My name is Jordan Rodgers, and I am a senior philosophy major and mathematics minor at the University of Kentucky. I am 
also involved in the Honors Program here at UK. 
I was the winner of the Kentucky Philosophical 
Association’s Student Essay Contest in both 2006 
and 2007, and of UK’s Kuiper-DeBoeur Scholarship 
for the 2005-2006 school year. This work is the fruit 
of a long-time love of the philosophy of Friedrich 
Nietzsche, and a constant desire to relate the issues he grappled with to 
concerns of the present day. It is hopefully only the beginning of my work 
in this area, which I wish to continue in the future in graduate school, 
where I hope to work toward a doctorate degree in philosophy. 
This project in particular was the Honors thesis resulting from a 
semester of study under the tutelage of Dr. Suketu Bhavsar, which was, 
in large part, involved in a study of recent evolutionary psychology and 
its implications for the moral and social fabric of the individual and 
society. The relationship between morality and individualism has been a 
passion for me in recent years, and it seemed to me that one of the most 
important (and perhaps most neglected) problems for an evolutionary 
worldview was how to find room for both a worthwhile morality and a 
healthy individualism. A sticky, but as I hope to show, not an irresolvable 
problem. My reading of Robert Wright’s The Moral Animal convinced me 
that these issues were not being approached with a sufficient degree of 
caution, and that only a return to a vital individualism such as Nietzsche’s 
could help us out of the forest. The result, I hope, is the promise of a new 
way of looking at ourselves as we fit into the evolutionary framework.
I would like especially to thank Dr. Bhavsar, who helped me immensely 
through in- and out-of-class discussions, and who read drafts of the paper 
as it was being written. Also, I would like to thank my fellow students in 
my Honors 301 class, who also read and suggested revisions for drafts of 
the paper, and whose points in in-class discussion helped to give birth to 
my ideas for the paper in the first place.
Abstract
Robert Wright’s recent book on evolutionary 
psychology, The Moral Animal, is concerned largely 
with the ethical implications of recent evolutionary 
science, and espouses a form of utilitarianism as 
the ethical theory that should naturally follow 
evolutionary insights into human psychology. 
This paper challenges that notion, with constant 
reference to the work of the philosopher Friedrich 
Nietzsche, on the basis that such an ethical theory 
places far too little emphasis on the individual as 
such, and is tantamount to a form of nihilism. 
This paper also argues that, while seeking for the 
happiness of other people is a good thing, our 
most sacred duty is not to our fellow man, but to 
ourselves, and that the greatest ethical imperative 
is to “become who you are.” We have received 
with distress the news that we are fundamentally 
selfish beings, but Nietzsche’s advice is not that 
we try to minimize that selfishness — rather, we 
should make ourselves worthy of it.
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Introduction
Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution has proven to be 
one of the most important and controversial scientific 
theories in the history of modern science. Of course, all 
scientific theories that are important and controversial 
on as grand a scale as Darwin’s become so largely on 
their extrascientific merits. Darwin’s theory of evolution 
has shown itself to be of great consequence in many 
areas other than biology. Because it has provided 
such a comprehensive view of the development of the 
human species, it has become relevant to religious, 
psychological, and moral investigations as well. Much 
ink has been spilled on the religious consequences of 
evolutionary theory, and the issue of how compatible a 
Biblically based religion can be with a theory telling us 
that humans have animals as their ancestors is still very 
much unresolved. I will not concern myself here with 
that debate, nor am I interested in the scientific validity 
of evolution as a theory. In this paper, I will assume that 
evolutionary theory is essentially scientifically valid, 
not because that is my reasoned scientific opinion, 
but because I am fundamentally concerned with other 
issues — issues that have gone largely unnoticed in the 
firestorm of the religion vs. science debate. 
Unlike other major scientific theories in the history 
of modern science, such as Copernicus’ theory of 
heliocentrism and Einstein’s theories of relativity, the 
theory of evolution has profound moral and psychological 
significance. While Copernicus and Einstein put forward 
models of the world that were radically different from 
the ones that had been previously envisioned, their 
content was still quite distant from humanity as a living, 
breathing being. They affected how we look at the world 
around us in very profound ways, yes, but they did not 
affect how we look at ourselves — not directly, at least. 
The theory of evolution, however, has been constantly 
accompanied by a very troubling question: what does 
this theory say about us? Immanuel Kant once noted 
that all questions of philosophy can be summed up in 
one: “what is man?” The truth about evolution is that it 
has brought this question to the forefront in a way that 
perhaps no other scientific theory can rival. 
Because it is so concerned with the development of 
humanity as a species, the theory of evolution invites us 
to think about humanity as a whole — in short, to ask, 
“what is man?” To attempt to answer this question is to 
venture into the dangerous and sometimes unfathomable 
depths of morality and psychology. Many smaller 
questions swarm the primary one as well. How different 
are we from animals? Do we differ in kind, or merely in 
degree? What are we to do with the knowledge of the 
principles of natural selection and survival of the fittest? 
These questions (and many others) have inspired a 
number of psychological and moral investigations (such 
as social Darwinism and Robert Wright’s utilitarianism) 
that have taken evolutionary insights into account and 
used them to form their theories. The remainder of 
this paper is devoted to examining social Darwinism 
and Wright’s utilitarianism. As we will see, these 
theories differ greatly from one another, and it might be 
worthwhile to wonder, as we go along, if the insights 
of evolution have led us any closer to answering Kant’s 
question.
Divergent Moral Theories
Before looking at two famous historical attempts to 
glean psychological and moral insight from evolutionary 
theory, a provisionary comment must be made about the 
relationship between morality and science. It is common 
in philosophy to speak of the “naturalistic fallacy” or 
the “is-ought problem,” which has been presented in 
many different formulations. The basic idea is simple: 
what is and what ought to be are two very different 
things, and one cannot determine what ought to be 
from what merely is. This is of considerable interest for 
us. Darwin’s theory of evolution is a scientific theory 
and, as such, it does not prescribe for us how things 
ought to be; rather, it describes how things really are. It 
might be the case that new scientific theories open up 
new moral questions, or allow us to test the efficiency 
of this or that moral theory (if the moral theory is at all 
testable, that is). But, it cannot help us to discover what 
might be the proper moral theory. In short, it cannot tell 
us what we ought to do.
One of the most famous attempts to glean moral 
and sociological insight from Darwin’s theory comes 
to us in the form of social Darwinism, which had 
begun to develop (although not under that name) 
even before Darwin had published his monumental 
Origin of Species in 1859. The movement has had 
many different proponents, all of whom had different 
ideas as to how it was conceived. However, what is 
important here is the use of Darwin’s principle of natural 
selection as a sociological (and later, moral) principle. 
In Darwin, natural selection is the process by which 
those individuals endowed with traits favorable to their 
survival and propagation are more likely to thrive in 
competition than individuals lacking those traits. It 
is a simple scientific principle. Because the stronger 
individual on average has traits that allow him or her 
to survive in competition, the stronger individual will 
be able to procreate more often and more successfully 
than the weaker. 
Although the principle is scientific, the social 
Darwinists applied it to social theory, saying that the 
fittest individuals in human society are more likely to 
survive in competition than those who are unfit. This 
scientific principle was, in turn, made into a moral 
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principle: the fittest individuals not only do, but ought 
to survive and thrive, and the weaker and less successful 
not only do, but ought to fail. Because the principle is 
elevated to the realm of morality, the concept of social 
progress becomes extremely important within social 
Darwinism. What was in Darwin’s scientific analyses 
a principle that merely guided species to become 
better adapted to their environment becomes in social 
Darwinism a moral progress: human society is constantly 
getting better and better, because the weak individuals 
are being weeded out. The stronger and more noble 
individuals should do all they can to survive, propagate, 
and pass on their genes to the next generation, and get 
rid of the weaker parts of society that might hold back 
social progress.
This moral outlook may, perhaps, seem utterly 
detestable from a modern point of view. It has been used 
by some to justify class systems and social inequality; it 
is, after all, perfectly “natural” to a social Darwinist that 
inequalities should exist among humans, and the correct 
way to deal with that inequality would be to encourage 
the strong to assert their superiority over the weak. In 
the end, the growing strength of humanity would be 
served, and society as a whole would progress. Because 
modern Western moral sentiments (influenced by recent 
movements for equality in civil rights for women and 
people of different races) tend toward a more egalitarian 
construction of society, this social Darwinist view has 
been largely rejected. Also, it has proven quite difficult 
to determine which individuals in society are, in fact, 
the “stronger” ones. Indeed, the term “strong” may 
be misleading; it seems obvious that we should not 
want society to be a means merely to a more physically 
strong people. Is intellectual strength meant? Moral 
strength? Eventually, “strength” becomes an objectively 
meaningless term; instead, those in political power use 
the principle to justify their oppression of those without 
power. However, the success of the politically powerful 
is not “progress” in any meaningful way.
It is for reasons such as these that, in the recent 
rise of psychological studies informed by evolutionary 
theory, evolutionary psychologists have generally been 
wary of any moralizing about the process of evolution, 
for fear that they might be labeled social Darwinists. 
The social Darwinists had confused what was “natural” 
with what was ethically preferable. Therefore, the new 
Darwinists avoided, if at all possible, any discussion of 
what is ethically preferable. However, recently this, too, 
has changed, and evolutionary psychologists are starting 
to moralize again, but this time with very different 
conclusions.
One of the most popular writers in this vein is 
the evolutionary psychologist Robert Wright, whose 
book, The Moral Animal, seeks, among other things, 
to provide a new look at how our concepts of morality might be informed 
by evolutionary science — a look that is not tainted by the view that just 
because something is “natural,” it is also ethically defensible. Wright wastes 
no time in making his intentions known; in his introduction, he writes:
 Can a Darwinian understanding of human nature help people reach 
their goals in life? Indeed, can it help them choose their goals? Can 
it help distinguish between practical and impractical goals? More 
profoundly, can it help in deciding which goals are worthy? That is, 
does knowing how evolution has shaped our basic moral impulses 
help us decide which impulses we should consider legitimate? The 
answers, in my opinion, are: yes, yes, yes, yes, and finally, yes. 
(Wright, p.10) 
Wright’s beliefs are quite clear; though he admits the danger of the 
naturalistic fallacy elsewhere, he still maintains that science can help us 
to determine what moral judgments are “legitimate.” Because Wright is 
aware of the fallacy that he seems to be falling into, we must see how he 
justifies this move. 
In order to look into this, it will be useful to remember the sorts of 
views that Wright is attempting to avoid, especially with respect to social 
Darwinism. What went wrong there? Basically, the discovery that all beings 
naturally sought their own self-interest was used as a justification for those 
in power to act selfishly, because they were in a position in which that was 
possible. Selfishness was essentially elevated to the highest moral good. It 
seems (at least to a modern person) that there is something wrong here: 
most of our most highly esteemed moral codes tell us that being unselfish 
and altruistic is the moral way to act. For example, Christianity, one of the 
most popular of religions, has as one of its foremost moral demands that 
we love our neighbors as ourselves, whether they are weak or strong. Many 
other world religions have similar moral laws. When the social Darwinist 
tells us that we should root out and eliminate the weak parts of society, 
rather than attempt to help them, it goes against these fundamental religious 
beliefs and most revered moral teachings.
Wright tells us that the seemingly universal acceptance of these moral 
teachings can be explained adequately by an evolutionary history of beings 
concerned fundamentally with themselves. The term Wright uses for this 
development is “reciprocal altruism,” though he is not the first to speak of 
it as such. The idea behind reciprocal altruism is quite simple: if we want 
to describe how we came to be altruistic (and came to make it our highest 
moral good) within an evolutionary context, which tells us that we are 
always looking out for “number one,” we have to explain how altruism 
might be useful to the individual. 
Wright’s basic explanation for this usefulness deals largely with a 
concept he calls “non-zero-sumness.” Wright invites us to think of ourselves 
as a chimp who has just found some food and decides to give it to a fellow 
chimp who has very little food. While you lose food in the exchange, the 
food is more valuable to the other chimp, precisely because he is in such 
dire need at the time. So, your loss is much less than the other chimp’s gain, 
and the two do not merely cancel each other out. “The essential feature 
of non-zero-sumness,” Wright tells us, “is that, through cooperation, or 
reciprocation, both players can be better off.” (Wright, p. 194) This perhaps 
somewhat obscure example is not the only case of non-zero-sumness, either; 
simple division of labor and trade of resources — cornerstones of practically 
every society with which we are familiar — are also prime cases. “The key 
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here…is that one animal’s surplus item can be another 
animal’s rare and precious good.” (Wright, p. 194)
Although there are other aspects of reciprocal 
altruism besides non-zero-sumness that further flesh 
out the theory, what is of most basic importance for 
our concerns is that Wright finds an evolutionary (i.e., 
a scientific) explanation for the arising of altruism as a 
morally laudable practice. While the theory of evolution 
had previously seemed to reveal to us that we were all 
fundamentally selfish, it now can reveal the possibility 
of human cooperation and altruism. Although it must 
be noted that this possibility has its basis in a more 
primary selfish drive. What Wright and other proponents 
of the reciprocal altruism theory suggest is not that we 
have evolved to be pure altruists, caring more for those 
around us than for ourselves; such a notion would 
be overly idealistic, under this view. Rather, what the 
study of evolutionary psychology has revealed to us is 
that being reciprocally altruistic is a much smarter and 
better way to be selfish. Wright puts it quite bluntly: 
“Exquisitely sensitive sympathy is just highly nuanced 
investment advice. Our deepest compassion is our best 
bargain hunting.” (Wright, p. 205)
So far we are dealing with more or less scientific 
matters. The theory of reciprocal altruism is a scientific 
model, meant not to extol the virtues of altruism, but 
to explain how the desire for it might have arisen out 
of natural selection. Wright’s account of reciprocal 
altruism is, I think, quite convincing. But he is not 
content to remain in the realm of scientific inquiry, 
and seeks to create an ethic from his scientific findings. 
Wright understands the moral dilemmas involved in the 
acceptance of natural selection and reciprocal altruism: 
if every action we commit is ultimately selfish, then our 
moral standards will have to be viewed differently. Pure 
altruism has been an ethical imperative for a long time, 
and now that it has been revealed to be overly optimistic 
idealism, “the question may be whether, after the new 
Darwinism takes root, the word moral can be anything 
but a joke.” (Wright, p. 326) 
The problem is a very real and distressing one, and 
brings up major philosophical questions: if our moral 
feelings and judgments developed as a result of the 
random and purposeless mutations of evolution, what 
kind of validity can they have? It seems that we have 
been denied the idea that we are free to react to our 
impulses in different ways. The moral feelings that we 
employ to combat our impulses are just as determined 
by evolution as the impulses themselves.
How are we to find our way out of this moral mess? 
Wright’s solution to the problem is quite different from 
that proposed by the social Darwinists; in fact, one might 
be hard-pressed to find another so strikingly opposed 
to social Darwinism. Wright makes it quite clear that 
his moral evaluations are in agreement with the ethical 
theory known as “utilitarianism.” This theory, developed 
mostly by English philosophers of the 19th century, 
such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill (and, 
interestingly enough, Darwin himself), proposes that our 
actions are governed by the principles of pleasure and 
pain. Pleasure and happiness are basically good, while 
pain and suffering are basically bad. So, it makes the 
most moral sense to seek to increase the pleasure and 
happiness of the greatest number of people. Developing 
our morality consists of finding more and more efficient 
ways to eliminate suffering and promote happiness. 
Though Wright mentions that Mill himself 
(utilitarianism’s greatest proponent) did not necessarily 
see his moral philosophy as deriving an “ought” from 
an “is,” he makes it clear that he thinks “that the 
goodness of happiness is, in fact, a moral value that 
remains unscathed by the naturalistic fallacy.” (Wright, 
p. 334) Wright’s commitment to utilitarianism seems, 
at least at first blush, to make a good deal of sense in 
an evolutionary context; it seems that processes such 
as reciprocal altruism, for example, have as their aim a 
sort of overall happiness. Two people cooperate with one 
another, and both benefit from the deal. The (successfully 
achieved) goal of the interaction is the happiness of all 
parties involved; Wright’s proposal is that we simply 
extrapolate, and apply the same principle to all of 
humanity. In other words, “You should … go through 
life considering the welfare of everyone else exactly as 
important as your own welfare.” (Wright, p. 336) So, the 
ethic that Wright derives from evolutionary science is 
diametrically opposed to that of social Darwinism: while 
the latter had preached selfishness as the greatest good, 
Wright would have us be as unselfish as possible. 
Two things about this ethical theory that will 
prove more important later must be mentioned in 
passing. While Wright considers it the most natural and 
unassailable ethical theory possible (who doesn’t want 
to be happy?), it contains certain presuppositions that 
might seem a bit more debatable. First: utilitarianism is 
essentially hedonistic: as was noted above, utilitarianism 
preaches that our actions are governed by pleasure and 
pain, and we should seek in all our actions to maximize 
the former and minimize the latter. It should be noted 
that “hedonism” ought to be distinguished from the 
connotations of the “rock n’ roll lifestyle” that are often 
connected to it: hedonists can (and more often than not, 
do) distinguish between higher and lower pleasures, and 
most would say that some form of delayed gratification is 
indispensable in living a truly pleasurable life. However, 
the claim that pleasure is essentially good, and pain is 
essentially bad, is a highly debatable ethical claim. 
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Second, utilitarianism is a consequentialist ethical 
theory. This means that it judges the consequences 
of an action, rather than the intentions of the person 
committing the action, as the morally important 
component of the act. In order to judge whether an act 
is good or evil, utilitarianism invites us to see how much 
happiness it will cause, and for how many people. In 
other words, it tells us to look at the consequences of our 
actions, and make our decisions based on them. This, 
like hedonism, is a highly debatable position: other moral 
thinkers have focused completely on human intention 
and will in their investigations.
We have now looked at two vastly different ethical 
theories, both claiming to arise from the insights of 
Darwin’s evolutionary theory. We must remember 
that, however different they are, they do spring from a 
common root. As such, they also contain some important 
similarities. The first theory, social Darwinism, was 
summarily rejected for a number of reasons, not the 
least of which was that it committed the naturalistic 
fallacy and derived an “ought” from an “is.” Wright 
claims that he has avoided this flaw in his own moral 
theorizing, but then conveniently neglects to explain 
why, pointing out that the explanation would involve 
too long a digression from his main topics of discussion. 
That is perfectly understandable; however, it is a claim 
that seems to me completely unfounded. 
As has already been indicated, utilitarianism, as 
an appropriate ethical theory, is not so undeniable as 
Wright seems to indicate. However, even if it were, that 
would still not allow us to jump from the “is” (I want 
happiness) to the “ought” (happiness is good). It is 
important to note that it is possible to agree with Wright 
on pragmatic grounds, and assert that happiness is what 
we all really want to pursue anyway, and still maintain 
that Wright falls victim to the naturalistic fallacy. But in 
doing so, we still must admit that the morality Wright 
offers is one of his own construction. It does not follow 
from his scientific conclusions, and thus loses much of 
its basis in commonly accepted premises.
Failing to avoid the naturalistic fallacy is not the only 
thing that social Darwinism and Wright’s utilitarianism 
have in common. They also both have some idea of 
historical human moral progress built into them. We 
have already explicitly discussed this view with respect 
to social Darwinism, but it is just as present in Wright’s 
moral theory. Wright’s utilitarianism works, however 
implicitly, with an end in mind. As our technology 
grows, and we become more intimately connected with 
people from the remotest regions of the earth, it becomes 
a matter of our evolutionary interest to care about 
everyone’s welfare. If what guides our moral judgment 
is the striving for the happiness of the greatest number 
of people, then technological evolution becomes moral evolution. The 
technological progress that allows us to connect to more and more people 
is equivalent to moral progress — those are more people whose suffering 
we can alleviate. Those are more people whom we can make happy. 
Just as the social Darwinists thought of the process of the strong 
overcoming the weak as the progress of the world toward a strong humanity, 
utilitarianism sees global communication and connection as the progress 
of the world toward a happy humanity. In both cases, there is a constant 
moral progress toward an end. This follows quite naturally from a point 
made earlier: Wright’s moral theory (and social Darwinism as well) is 
consequentialist. It stands to reason that a theory concerned primarily with 
the ends of an action rather than the intentions behind that act would be 
absolutely concerned with the ultimate end of the process. A consequentialist 
moral theory, when pushed to its limits, seeks a good consequence (that 
is, a good end) not just to every singular human action, but also to human 
action as a whole.
Another similarity between the two theories that might not be 
immediately apparent is a certain style of moralizing. We must keep in mind 
that both theories at least purport to be derived from a scientific principle. 
For that reason, both attempt to offer a scientifically testable morality. In 
the modern age, in which scientific knowledge seems to have emerged as 
the paradigm for knowledge in general, it would seem quite natural to try 
to formulate a scientific morality. Social Darwinism attempts to do so on 
the basis of the nebulous concept of “strength,” and fails, but Wright’s 
utilitarianism is a bit more subtle and powerful. Happiness and pleasure, 
in this context, are far less ambiguous terms; we seem to know intuitively 
what is meant when we use them. And it would seem quite possible to 
scientifically test their presence or absence. 
Take an obvious case for an example: the moral value of “thou shalt 
not kill” is easily testable under utilitarian methods. In fact, we can do the 
test more or less in our minds. Being killed, or having someone close to me 
killed, would greatly impinge on my happiness, and having the ability to kill 
people when I want does not seem to greatly enhance my happiness, nor can 
I imagine it doing so for another person, unless he or she is quite abnormal. 
In any case, the value of the moral restriction “thou shalt not kill” has been 
tested, and in this case it passes the test. Even if there are more subtle cases 
in which this experiment cannot be performed by the imagination alone, it 
can always in theory be tested in real life. This, in fact, is possibly the most 
important advantage of Wright’s utilitarianism. It seems less active in social 
Darwinism, but that is not because it is ascientific. Rather, it is because it 
attempted to be scientific and failed. An ideal of both moral views is that 
moral theories ought to be testable, i.e., scientific.
It is to similarities between the two theories such as these that I would 
like to turn, because I find myself to be unsympathetic, and even hostile, 
to all of them. I realize that this feeling of mine is not universal. It makes a 
lot of sense to some people to judge actions based on their consequences 
to the general public, and thus to progress morally toward a good ultimate 
consequence; it makes a lot of sense to some to seek to derive our moral 
principles from undeniable scientific ones, and thus to seek a scientifically 
testable morality. All of these, as they have been presented thus far, seem 
to be relatively benign, and seem to follow quite naturally from indubitable 
principles. They also seem to set quite reachable moral goals. There is a 
sense behind the whole of Wright’s book that the time is not far away 
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when we will all be able to live in relative peace with 
one another, and nothing could be more natural. It all 
seems so easy. 
“Of course,” Wright warns, “if you’re not a 
utilitarian, sorting these issues out may be more 
complex.” (Wright, p. 341) Unfortunately, (or perhaps 
not so unfortunately) this statement rings true, and I 
also find myself compelled to sort out these issues in 
a different way than Wright, despite the complexity. 
Living morally seems to me something difficult and 
complex, and the ease with which Wright discusses it 
troubles me. It is not merely this, however, that drives 
me to the moral depths — I find that when I look into 
the underlying structures of moral theories such as 
Wright’s, I am largely unsatisfied with their view of 
morality and human nature. Though they may seem to 
make perfectly good sense on the surface, they contain 
certain assumptions that, if taken seriously, might kill 
any satisfying concept of morality. “The title of this 
book [The Moral Animal] is not wholly without irony” 
(Wright, p. 13). Indeed.
A quick note about the direction being taken here is 
necessary: I will focus mostly on a critique of Wright’s 
utilitarianism, and largely neglect social Darwinism. 
Much of what I say may apply to social Darwinism as 
well, but I will focus on Wright, because his theories are 
still convincing people. Social Darwinism had its heyday, 
but its faults are by now obvious to most, and I do not 
intend to beat a dead horse. The dirty little secrets of 
utilitarianism are somewhat less known, however, and 
deserve to be brought to light. For this reason, though 
my critiques are primarily directed at consequentialism, 
moral progress, and scientific morality, I will use Wright’s 
utilitarianism (and not social Darwinism) as a prototype 
of the morality at which this critique is aimed. 
A New Perspective
I wanted only to try to live in accord with the 
promptings which came from my true self. Why 
was that so very difficult” — Hermann Hesse 
(Hesse, p. 1)
The critique of utilitarianism that I will put forward 
here, and the consequent elaboration of a better way of 
looking at morality, is informed greatly by the nineteenth 
century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. Why I 
pick him above the large number of other philosophers 
who are also decidedly anti-utilitarian will become fully 
clear only by the end of the analysis. However, a few 
preliminary remarks about my selection of Nietzsche 
are perhaps necessary. Indeed, the choice might 
initially seem somewhat strange. Nietzsche is certainly 
considered one of the greatest philosophers of morality 
who ever existed, but this is largely because of his 
brilliant critiques of morality. So, while it might seem 
that Nietzsche could provide a devastating critique of 
utilitarianism (and he certainly is up to the task), it might 
also seem that his critiques would apply to morality in 
general, and that no positive notions of morality are to 
be found in his writings. 
I think this is misleading, largely because of a 
certain ambiguity in the term “morality.” It can, on the 
one hand, mean a system of rules or doctrines that is 
generally applicable to all of humanity, such as the Ten 
Commandments. However, it can also mean the simple 
concept of valuing one thing over another. I decide to 
value freedom of the press more highly than censorship, 
for instance, and in doing so I make a “moral” decision. 
To deny or critique “morality” in the first sense in no 
way condemns one to say that nothing is preferable to 
anything else. 
While Nietzsche’s critiques of morality are scathing, 
I think that they are aimed at morality in the former sense, 
the broad, general system of moral rules; to question the 
latter, the making of specific value judgments, would 
be practically inconceivable: “how could you live 
according to … indifference? … [Living is] — estimating, 
preferring, being unjust, being limited, wanting to be 
different.” (Nietzsche, 2000, p. 205) As our discussion 
of Nietzsche unfolds, we will see that, because being 
an individual (i.e., being different rather than indifferent 
— asserting oneself and one’s estimations) is one of 
Nietzsche’s most valued “morals,” he is committed to 
attacking the concept of a “morality” that would stifle 
such individuals. Without distinguishing between the 
two, one could paradoxically assert that Nietzsche’s 
morality is opposed to morality. With the distinction, 
however, the paradox dissolves.
With that in mind, let us see what Nietzsche 
might have to say about Wright’s utilitarianism. One of 
Nietzsche’s oft-quoted phrases is: “In the end one loves 
one’s desire and not what is desired.” (Nietzsche, 2000, 
p. 283) Contained in this small phrase is Nietzsche’s 
first critique of utilitarianism: what we really love is 
not the objects we receive or the ends that come about 
from our actions, but the process of getting those objects 
and reaching those ends. I feel much more passion for 
the object of desire, for instance, when I am pursuing 
and trying to obtain it, than I do when I have already 
achieved my goal. Proverbs such as “absence makes 
the heart grow fonder” ring true in this light. Granted, 
I had the end of my pursuit in mind as I went, but my 
most intimate connection is not to that end, or even 
to the object of desire itself, but to my desire. I might 
add, though I do not think Nietzsche says this, that it 
is largely because we are so intimately connected with 
our desires that we tend to moralize about them, rather 
than their objects. So, I think it is in some sense natural 
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to be dissatisfied with a morality that addresses itself 
only to the objects of our desires (such as the utility of 
an action’s consequence), and never approaches what 
are most important to us: our intentions and desires 
themselves.
This small point informs Nietzsche’s second 
and more thoroughgoing critique of consequentialist 
theories of morality. It was mentioned in passing above 
that, while Wright claims his moral theories are based 
on scientific truths, he also left open the possibility of 
accepting utilitarianism on pragmatic grounds. While 
I consider it proven that Wright’s utilitarianism does 
not follow from scientific truths (precisely because that 
would be impossible), one still might ask: don’t we all 
really want happiness? Even if we can’t “prove” that it 
is true that we should work toward being happy, don’t 
we all really want that anyway, and isn’t that enough? 
Nietzsche’s response to this question is an emphatic 
“no.” One of the most important and radical aspects 
of Nietzsche’s thought is a critique of this valuing of 
happiness and contentment as the highest good. Wright 
says that “we should look at moral axioms the way a 
prospector looks at shiny rocks — with great respect and 
great suspicion,” (Wright, p. 362) and surely Nietzsche 
would agree. As he was fond of pointing out, many 
moral philosophers have taken their own morality for 
granted as the true one and attempt to give reasons for it 
after the fact; they never really see the problem inherent 
in morality itself, i.e., the problem of determining the 
value of different moralities. (Nietzsche, 2000, pp. 287-
9) However, it seems that Wright has not completely 
learned this lesson. He never inspects his moral axiom 
(that happiness is the greatest good) but simply attempts 
to found it rationally.
Nietzsche, on the other hand, is more than willing to 
inspect this moral axiom, which was just as widespread 
(indeed, perhaps more so) in the nineteenth century 
as it is now. Nietzsche finds this morality of happiness 
problematic. Why? First: utilitarianism claims that 
we are governed by pleasure and pain, and that we 
should seek to minimize the latter while maximizing 
the former. However, Nietzsche would call this an 
impossible endeavor — pleasure and pain are, in a 
sense, interdependent on one another. “If you decide…to 
diminish and lower the level of human pain, you also 
have to diminish and lower the level of their capacity 
for joy.” (Nietzsche, 1974, p. 86) If this is the case, then 
minimizing the pain of the world comes at a steep price, 
and a utilitarian morality seems to offer us not a utopia 
filled with happiness, but merely “as little displeasure 
as possible, painlessness in brief.” (Nietzsche, 1974, 
p. 86) It would seem that, under this conception of 
happiness (i.e., the minimization of pain), to be happy 
is merely to be satisfied with the state of things, and 
to have ceased needing to get very excited about life 
anymore. This is, for Nietzsche, the deeper truth of the 
interdependence of pleasure and pain: in order for life 
to be worth living, the tension between great pain and 
great joy must be present.
If we are to take this seriously, then we must take 
a different attitude toward pain and suffering. It should 
no longer be a pure evil that we always avoid. We 
must ask why joy and pain are interdependent, and the 
answer is that our joy often comes from hard-fought 
battles with things of which we are afraid, things that 
cause us pain. Thus, Nietzsche tells us in a particularly 
exciting passage:
 For believe me: the secret for harvesting from 
existence the greatest fruitfulness and the 
greatest enjoyment is — to live dangerously! 
Build your cities on the slopes of Vesuvius! Send 
your ships into uncharted seas! Live at war with 
your peers and yourselves! (Nietzsche, 1974, 
p. 228)
It seems that nothing could be more at odds with 
utilitarianism. Living at war with each other is certainly 
not the way to promote the happiness of the greatest 
number. And, indeed, one might be a bit wary of such 
teachings — they might make one a bit afraid. But this 
is precisely Nietzsche’s point: “the imperative of herd 
timidity: ‘we want that some day there should be nothing 
any more to be afraid of.’…the will and way to this day is 
now called ‘progress.’” (Nietzsche, 2000, p. 304) As long 
as this is the sort of “progress” at which our morality 
aims, we are aiming at something very suspicious. If 
the joys and sorrows of life are dependent on a certain 
degree of suffering and danger, then what would it mean 
to get rid of this suffering and danger?
 You want, if possible…to abolish suffering. And 
we? It really seems that we would rather have it 
higher and worse than ever. Well-being as you 
understand it — that is no goal, that seems to us 
an end, a state that soon makes man ridiculous 
and contemptible — that makes his destruction 
desirable. (Nietzsche, 2000, p. 343)
Thus, we see what the utilitarian “progress” really 
leads to: a devaluing of life itself. Fundamentally, to 
want above all to get rid of suffering is to decide that 
life is not worth living, for life is (quite literally) nothing 
without suffering. Consequently, a desire for this progress 
is a desire for an end to life, and as such is a form of 
nihilism.
It is this nihilism that hides below the glossy 
surface of such high-sounding ideas as “the happiness 
of the greatest number” with which Nietzsche is 
ultimately concerned. It is the inspiration for one of the 
more famous passages of his writings: his discussion 
J o r d a n  r o g e r sn i e t z s c h e  c o n t r a  W r i g h t :  o n  B e c o m i n g  W h a t  y o u  a r e
T h E  U n I v E r S I T y  O f  K E n T U C K y  J O U r n A L  O f  U n D E r g r A D U AT E  S C h O L A r S h I P   6
of “the last men” in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The 
last men are so named because they represent the 
success of the sort of nihilistic progress just discussed. 
They have diminished completely their capacity for 
joy or suffering, and have thus fallen into a state of 
complacency and contentment. “‘What is love? What 
is creation? What is longing? What is a star?’ thus asks 
the last man, and he blinks.” (Nietzsche, 1976, p. 
129) In these questions, the last men show that they 
have renounced all the things that had made life so 
dangerous, exciting, and worth living in the past. They 
no longer even know what these things are. Though the 
last men claim to have “invented happiness,” they have 
really only created a life in which they no longer have 
to worry about the happiness that means something 
— that is, joy, great passion, a happiness that one has 
fought for. They are resigned to a life of boredom and 
stagnation.
So, what seemed like a very high ideal indeed, 
the happiness of the greatest number, turned out to be 
a hidden desire for destruction and death. One might 
ask with some urgency, if morality is not to be found 
here, where the ground seemed so solid, where are we 
to turn now? Ultimately, Nietzsche’s advice is simple, 
though certainly not easy to follow: no one can tell you 
where to turn but you, yourself, as an individual. The 
error that all moralities make is that they investigate 
what one should do in any given situation, and thus 
are no discriminator of persons. What I really want to 
know is what I should do in a given situation, and only 
I can determine that for myself. 
Wright’s utilitarianism commits this error perhaps 
more flagrantly than most other moral philosophies: 
he tells us that we should view the welfare of others 
just as highly as our own welfare — every individual 
looks at him- or herself as the most important creature 
in the world, and obviously they cannot all be right. 
But Wright’s point is unnecessarily absolutistic. We are 
not talking about who really is “the most important 
person on Earth” in an objective sense, but how we, 
ourselves, should view ourselves. In this sense, I cannot 
view others as more important than myself. I am my 
most immediate concern. The fear of the selfishness 
inherent in social Darwinism sent Wright to the other 
extreme: perfect selflessness. But the lesson of social 
Darwinism is not that selfishness is evil; it is that 
selfishness not tempered by moderation can lead to 
disastrous consequences. 
As we have seen, pure, thoughtless selflessness 
can lead to consequences just as disastrous. Nietzsche 
advocates a moderate position between these two 
extremes: “Self-interest,” Nietzsche tells us, “is worth 
as much as the person who has it: it can be worth a 
great deal, and it can be unworthy and contemptible.” 
(Nietzsche, 1976, p. 533) Selfishness is not evil. It is a 
fact of life, as evolution has helped to teach us. I am, 
without a doubt, more interested in myself than any 
other person in the world. The real moral imperative is 
not to minimize this interest, but to make oneself into a 
person who is worthy of it. It is this fundamental point 
that forms the core of Nietzsche’s individualism.
Because I am advocating an individualistic morality, 
moral theories in the traditional sense are inadequate, 
because they attempt to come up with general rules that 
apply to all people. Morality must be a discriminator of 
persons: “it is immoral to say: ‘what is right for one is 
fair for the other.’” (Nietzsche, 2000, p. 339) It is worth 
noting that this remark is not restricted to utilitarian 
and consequentialist moral theories; theories that seek 
to moralize about human intentions and duties, such 
as the ethics of Kant, are just as hated by Nietzsche. 
Like consequentialist theories, these moral theories 
proclaim that what is good for one person is good for 
all. Nietzsche’s complete opposition to this might seem 
odd; after all, is it not commonly held that all human 
beings have a conscience, which tells them what is really 
right and wrong?
 But why do you listen to the voice of your 
conscience? And what gives you the right to 
consider such a judgment true and infallible? For 
this faith [i.e. the faith in one’s conscience] — is 
there no conscience for that? Have you never heard 
of an intellectual conscience? A conscience behind 
your “conscience”? (Nietzsche, 1974, p. 263)
What Nietzsche ultimately prescribes is to look 
behind our moral motivations, to look relentlessly deeper 
and deeper and to gain a greater knowledge of ourselves. 
As our study of evolution has pointed out to us, what 
seem to us to be pure and innocent moral feelings 
sometimes turn out to be nothing but “highly nuanced 
investment advice.” What is needed is an “intellectual 
conscience,” a ceaseless drive to know more about 
ourselves, and to seek constantly the answer to Kant’s 
question “what is man?” Though we might now rephrase 
the question: “who am I?” My fundamental concern in 
life is to discover who I am, and to create out of myself 
my own moral values:
 Let us therefore limit ourselves to the purification 
of our opinions and valuations and to the 
creation of our own new tables of what is good, 
and let us stop brooding about the “moral value 
of our actions!” … We…want to become those 
we are — human beings who are new, unique, 
incomparable, who give themselves laws, who 
create themselves. (Nietzsche, 1974, p. 266) 
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From thoughts such as this we can formulate what 
is, for Nietzsche, the ultimate moral imperative: you 
should become who you are. A rather mysterious phrase, 
certainly. Surely I already am “what I am;” to speak of 
becoming what I already am would seem paradoxical, if 
not outright contradictory. The contradiction, however, 
is only apparent, not real. Nietzsche is implying that we 
are, in a sense, separated from ourselves, especially in 
the realm of morality. We have been “brooding about 
the moral value of actions” so much that we have 
completely covered over and corrupted our deepest 
opinions and valuations; these are the “promptings of 
the true self” that Hesse spoke about in the quote that 
introduced this section. 
It is hard to follow these “promptings,” because our 
tendency has become to disown them in favor of such 
moral standards as the happiness of the greatest number, 
or Kant’s categorical imperative: “we are necessarily 
strangers to ourselves, we do not comprehend 
ourselves … for us the law ‘Each is furthest from 
himself’ applies to eternity.” (Nietzsche, 2000, p. 451) 
And so, the drive to become what one is is really the 
highest expression of what Nietzsche had called the 
intellectual conscience. Through a combination of our 
two most profound and important drives, the will to 
truth and self-interest, we can perhaps set to the task of 
discovering ourselves, and, in fact, creating ourselves.
The former of those tasks is certainly not easy. It 
requires great honesty and willingness to look at the 
less savory parts of oneself. The latter, however, would 
seem almost impossible. How do we create ourselves? 
For Nietzsche, this is the true realm for moralities, for 
tables of values. The key is that these tables of values are 
not created to apply to all of mankind; they apply only 
to me, for the simple reason that I have created them for 
myself and no one else. Nietzsche’s infamous conception 
of the übermensch presents the Nietzschean ideal: spirits 
that have elevated and strengthened themselves to the 
point that they can create their own values. To illumine 
his point, Nietzsche sometimes speaks of this creation of 
values in terms of aesthetics. Nietzsche had said in his 
very first book that “art represents the highest task and 
the truly metaphysical activity of this life,” (Nietzsche, 
2000, p. 32) That is, creating oneself is an aesthetic 
endeavor, and yet it is not an arbitrary and senseless 
creation, for it has metaphysical significance. Thus, 
Nietzsche praises the ability “to ‘give style’ to one’s 
character,” which allows us to achieve the “one thing 
that is needful,” which is “that a human being should 
attain satisfaction with himself.” (Nietzsche, 1974, p. 
232-3) What he is attempting here is a kind of fusion 
of ethical and aesthetic ideals — giving style to one’s 
character is certainly an aesthetic endeavor, but being 
satisfied with oneself is ethical, metaphysical. It seems 
to me that the nature of the fusion remains obscure, but I also think that 
this obscurity is, in a sense, necessary. Only you can give concrete meaning 
to this fusion for yourself. If Nietzsche could simply set out an easy formula 
for one to follow in order to give style to one’s character, the value of the 
idea and Nietzsche’s individualism would be completely undermined. The 
lasting image left with us is that the work is still left to be done, and only 
you can do it.
 The man of knowledge must not only love his enemies, he must 
also be able to hate his friends.
 One repays a teacher badly if one always remains nothing but a 
pupil. And why do you not want to pluck at my wreath? …
 … You are my believers — but what matter all believers? You had 
not yet sought yourselves: and you found me. Thus do all believers; 
therefore all faith amounts to so little.
 Now I bid you lose me and find yourselves; and only when you 
have denied me will I return to you. (Nietzsche, 1976, p. 190)
Conclusion
In the course of defending his claim that utilitarianism is the appropriate 
ethical theory to derive from evolutionary psychology, Wright discusses a 
group of people who might, at first glance, seem to be accepting my view. 
These people
 … might say that although happiness is a fine thing, they don’t 
think there should be any such thing as a consensually accepted 
moral code. That’s their prerogative. They are free to opt out of 
moral discourse, and out of any obligations, and benefits, that the 
resulting code might bring. (Wright, 334-5)
This seems to be the most apparent danger for an individualist ethic. 
I have mentioned already that an ethic such as Nietzsche’s is obscure, and 
that such obscurity is necessary, because only the individual can illuminate 
it, and she can only do so for herself. But when we enter the realm of moral 
discourse, such obscurity presents a real problem. I want to be able to 
explain to someone what my moral motivations are and, to a certain extent, 
I take their moral judgments of me seriously, and I expect them to do the 
same for my moral judgments of them. We would hardly be satisfied with 
a murderer justifying his actions by way of asserting that his reasons for 
doing so, while perfectly clear to him, must remain obscure to us because 
of their individual nature. We would want him to explain his motivations 
for doing so, and evaluate whether they were right or wrong. If we accept 
a full-on individualism in ethics, it would seem that all moral discourse 
would be rendered useless.
There is a related point to be raised here as well. Our moral discourse 
is often largely concerned with the harm an action inflicts on other people. 
For example, the murderer, in general, is in the wrong because he needlessly 
makes another person suffer. However, if suffering, as we have said, is 
necessary for joy, and if the desire to abolish suffering is really a form of 
nihilism, shouldn’t we all become masochists, and seek above all to suffer 
as much as possible? To provide an extreme example: what if I decided to 
torture a young child? Nietzsche’s view would seem to suggest that this 
action is morally defensible, or even admirable; after all, in increasing 
the child’s suffering, I also increase its capacity for joy. The deeper the 
J o r d a n  r o g e r sn i e t z s c h e  c o n t r a  W r i g h t :  o n  B e c o m i n g  W h a t  y o u  a r e
T h E  U n I v E r S I T y  O f  K E n T U C K y  J O U r n A L  O f  U n D E r g r A D U AT E  S C h O L A r S h I P   6
suffering I cause without killing the child, the deeper 
the joys it will be capable of experiencing. Indeed, if 
desiring happiness and contentment as our final goal is 
nihilism, shouldn’t we seek above all to be unhappy? 
But surely this is nonsense. Who could live this way? 
And wouldn’t this be merely another and perhaps more 
potent nihilism?
These are serious objections, but I think that they 
are aimed at a position that is far more extreme than 
the one I advocate. What I think must be made clear, 
above all, is this: happiness is not, in itself, a bad 
thing. I am not trying to assert that it is when I say 
that Wright’s utilitarianism leads to a form of nihilism. 
My problem with Wright’s utilitarianism is not that it 
seeks to promote happiness. I think, in fact, that such 
promotion is quite worthwhile, and that happiness can 
be a very good thing. My objection to Wright’s moral 
views is that he elevates happiness to the position of 
highest and absolute good. The “second nihilism” of 
the preceding paragraph, on the other hand, goes to the 
opposite extreme, and elevates unhappiness (or capacity 
for joy, depending on how one wants to look at it) to the 
position of absolute good. It is just as mistaken, and I 
find it just as unacceptable.
What I find unacceptable is the whole process of 
elevating mere concepts such as “joy” and “happiness” 
to any ultimate or absolute significance. Such a process 
cheapens life. Life is not a straight line toward a single 
goal, which ends when one reaches that goal. Life is a 
tension between extremes, and between goals. The most 
fundamental problem that traditional moral theorists 
encounter is not that they choose bad goals, but that 
they reject the importance of the tension. Nihilism is a 
rejection of life. As such, it is a rejection of that tension. 
Happiness is good, as far as it goes, and so, too, is having 
a higher capacity for joy. But neither of these is the 
ultimate good, which should always be pursued at the 
expense of the other. To assert the opposite would be to 
say that one of these two is not really good, and that goes 
directly against our most fundamental instincts. I cannot 
regard happiness as bad, nor can I regard capacity for 
joy as bad; either of these alternatives would make life 
impossible, and so both are tantamount to nihilism.
Once this is recognized, I think that it becomes 
possible to reconcile individualist ethics with moral 
discourse. This is possible because the realm of moral 
discourse (i.e., public morality, political right, etc.) is 
governed not by absolute goods, but by many different 
goods in tension with one another. Because it does not 
have an absolute good for which we always positively 
aim, this realm presents us with a negative morality. The 
law rarely tells us what we should do, because to do 
so would be to claim that it knows what is best for our 
lives. Much more often, it tells us what we are prohibited 
from doing. This approach requires no such absolute 
claim, because it is involved in the situations arising from 
interaction among people, and our duties to others. But 
this approach cannot be the whole of morality; a truly 
worthwhile morality must provide us with some sort 
of positive motivation for us as individuals. The most 
basic function of individualism in our ethical life is to 
be this positive motivation, and to provide us with an 
ideal toward which we should strive. When Nietzsche 
tells us to “become those we are,” the statement has the 
feel not of a restriction but of an invitation. 
This separation between positive and negative 
morality is absolutely essential. Wright’s problem, 
which he shares with most moral theorists, is that he 
thinks that our moral discourse should address positive 
moral claims. That is, we ought to actively go out and 
increase the happiness of the greatest number of people, 
and elevate this above all other practices. As we have 
seen, however, this leads to nihilism. Activities such 
as the seeking of the happiness of the greatest number 
can be justifiable pursuits. But, they are not sufficient in 
themselves. Happiness is far too concrete and universal 
a goal to provide positive impetus for an individual to 
act. It ought not be the highest authority to which all 
our actions are subordinated. 
It is my conviction that, while moral discourse and 
the realm of negative morality in general are important, 
they still remain subordinate to the positive invitation 
to “become those we are.” We are used to thinking of 
our duties to others as being of ultimate importance, 
whereas we often forget, or even reject outright, that 
we have, first and foremost, a duty to ourselves. This is 
the deeper meaning of evolutionary psychology’s claim 
that we are all fundamentally selfish, and Nietzsche’s 
teaching that “Self-interest is worth as much as the 
person who has it.” Our duties to our fellow human 
beings are certainly sacred, but if we regard these duties 
as the most important ones, we deny ourselves. Our most 
vital and sacred duty is to ourselves — only as such can 
our lives be satisfying.
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